PG 538-544 Onora O'Neill: Kantian Approaches to Some Famine ProblemsOnline Simplified SummaryO'Neill's approach to the question of what affluent people ought to do for thosesuffering from famine differs substantially from Peter Singer's. Instead of giving autilitarian account, which focuses strictly on the consequences of one's actions, shegives a Kantian, duty-based account, which focuses on peop
...[Show More]
PG 538-544 Onora O'Neill: Kantian Approaches to Some Famine Problems
Online Simplified Summary
O'Neill's approach to the question of what affluent people ought to do for those
suffering from famine differs substantially from Peter Singer's. Instead of giving a
utilitarian account, which focuses strictly on the consequences of one's actions, she
gives a Kantian, duty-based account, which focuses on people's intentions.
She begins by briefly explicating one of the central claims of Kantian ethics, that one
must never treat a person (either oneself or another) as mere means, but "always at
the same time as an end.
She explains that, according to Kant, the moral worth of one's actions is determined
by the maxim (or intention) that governs the decision to act, not by the act's
consequences. Using a person as a mere means involves an intention to involve the
person in an action "to which they could not in principle consent.
So, while one often uses people as means (e.g., when one uses a cashier to pay for
groceries), this is usually done with the other person's consent. However, if one
deceives the other person (by a false promise, for example), then the other person in
principle cannot consent, for deception requires that the other person not know of
the deceit, and consent requires an absence of deception.
Not treating other people as mere means is a clear requirement of Kantian ethics;
beneficent treatment of other people (e.g., by actively promoting their ends),
however, is not a requirement.
Where a utilitarian thinks that one must act beneficently when doing so will
promote overall happiness, a Kantian thinks that one need not aim at overall good
(i.e., overall best consequences) in one's actions.
Acting beneficently may be a good thing to do, but one is only morally required not
to treat other people as mere means. Applying Kantian ethics to famine
circumstances, O'Neill argues that in a famine-stricken population, one has
obligations not to cheat on any rationing scheme and to fulfill one's duties to
particular people (e.g., one's dependents).
However, for those living outside the stricken population, the requirements are less
exacting. Outsiders are obligated not to take advantage of those stricken (with
exploitative business deals, for example), and those whose work leads them to deal
directly with people in stricken areas are obligated not to take advantage of their
relative power
[Show Less]
Access Full Document
Instant download after payment
Card Payments
₿
Crypto Accepted